Talking \u27Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition For and In the Field of Competition Law by McChesney, Fred S.
Northwestern University School of Law
Law and Economics Papers
Year  Paper 
Talking ’Bout My Antitrust Generation:
Competition For and In the Field of
Competition Law
Fred S. McChesney∗
∗Northwestern University School of Law, f-mcchesney@kellogg.northwestern.edu
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-
cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art32
Copyright c©2003 by the author.
Talking ’Bout My Antitrust Generation:
Competition For and In the Field of
Competition Law
Fred S. McChesney
Abstract
Twenty-seven years ago I took my law-school antitrust course, from a fledgling
assistant professor who had just left the Federal Trade Commission. My per-
formance was adequate, earning one of the better grades in the course, but not
spectacular. Unspectacular enough that afterwards the professor said it disap-
pointed him. In retrospect, I think I under-performed because I was a soon-to-be
economist as well as a budding lawyer. Like many people back then, I approached
antitrust with a presumption that the gears of industrial-organization economics
and antitrust law meshed more or less synchronously. But such a presumption
was unwarranted, to say the least. As the course developed, it increasingly dawned
that antitrust law, supposedly devoted to enhancing competition, was more a part
of the problem than the solution. A few who had thought about all this longer
had figured it out already. But for a callow law student at the time, it was difficult
to mesh the economics of competition with “competition” law. I went into the
exam conflicted, and evidently it showed. The conflicts today are fewer, thanks to
a new brand of antitrust thinking that has developed and a new breed of antitrust
enforcers that have arrived over the past generation. Often the new thinkers and
enforcers are one and the same. The assistant professor who taught me antitrust is
now the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, having written prolifically
on both the Commission and antitrust law generally. Likewise, seminal scholars
- also among my contemporaries and teaching colleagues - such as Frank Easter-
brook, Richard Posner and Diane Wood - now as judges apply the new law that
they espoused as academics. This article describes aspects of the evolution by
which new antitrust rules have emerged to stimulate the salutary (if incomplete)
rapprochement between economics and law in antitrust. In effect, the new rules
have emerged from various types of competition, of two general sorts. To invoke
Harold Demsetz’s useful distinction, the competition has occurred in the field
and for the field of antitrust. That is, the current generation has witnessed com-
petition, first, as to which intellectual (including economic) paradigm animates
antitrust law - competition for the field. As Section I details, competition for the
field has included competition in the federal judiciary, some of that competition
represented by acts of seeming judicial disobedience in antitrust. Thereafter, there
has been considerable competition in the field, along lines to be described in sec-
tion II, focusing on developments (some desirable, some not) in enforcement of
the antitrust laws.
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TALKING ‘BOUT MY ANTITRUST GENERATION: 
COMPETITION FOR AND IN THE FIELD OF COMPETITION LAW 
Fred S. McChesney* 
Now I ain’t looking to compete with you. 
Beat or cheat or mistreat you… 
All I really want to do. 
Is baby be friends with you.1 
 
The customer is our enemy; the competitor is our friend.2 
 
 
Introduction 
Twenty-seven years ago I took my law-school antitrust course, from a fledgling assistant 
professor who had just left the Federal Trade Commission.  My performance was adequate, 
earning one of the better grades in the course, but not spectacular.  Unspectacular enough that 
afterwards the professor said it disappointed him.   
                                                 
*  Northwestern University; Class of 1967 / James B. Haddad Professor of Law; Professor, Department of 
Management & Strategy, Kellogg School of Management.  The research assistance of Jim McMasters and Suzette 
Young Won is acknowledged with gratitude, as are comments from Henry Butler and William Carney on an earlier 
draft.  The author is also grateful to the Emory University School of Law for making this Thrower Symposium 
possible.  He remembers fondly his many years of teaching at Emory, during which his wife had the privilege of 
practicing law with Randolph Thrower.  Thanks to that uxorial professional affiliation, the author enjoyed many 
social encounters over the years with Margaret and Randolph Thrower. 
 
1  B. Dylan, All I Really Want to Do (ASCAP, Warner Bros. Music). 
 
2  Internal slogan among executives at Archer Daniels Midland, whose alleged price fixing in the 1990s led to 
criminal antitrust convictions.  See K. Eichenwald, The Informant (2000); J. Lieber, Rats in the Grain: The Dirty 
Tricks and Trials of Archer Daniels Midland (2000). 
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In retrospect, I think I under-performed because I was a soon-to-be economist as well as a 
budding lawyer.  Like many people back then, I approached antitrust with a presumption that the 
gears of industrial-organization economics and antitrust law meshed more or less synchronously.  
But such a presumption was unwarranted, to say the least.  As the course developed, it 
increasingly dawned that antitrust law, supposedly devoted to enhancing competition, was more 
a part of the problem than the solution.  A few who had thought about all this longer had figured 
it out already.3  But for a callow law student at the time, it was difficult to mesh the economics of 
competition with “competition” law.  I went into the exam conflicted, and evidently it showed.4  
The conflicts today are fewer, thanks to a new brand of antitrust thinking that has 
developed and a new breed of antitrust enforcers that have arrived over the past generation.5   
Often the new thinkers and enforcers are one and the same.  The assistant professor who taught 
me antitrust is now the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, having written prolifically 
on both the Commission and antitrust law generally.6  Likewise, seminal scholars -- also among 
                                                 
3  Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 157 (1954); see also R. Bork; The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself  (1978); Liebeler, Towards a 
Consumers’ Antitrust Law: The Federal Trade Commission and Vertical Merges in the Cement Industry, 15 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1153 (1968); D. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure (1982).  And 
some, fortunately,  figured it out later.  E.g., Baumol & Ordover.Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J. Law 
& Econ. 247 (1985). 
 
4  Ironically, as I was learning antitrust, the Supreme Court was considering cases that ultimately improved the 
alignment between the economics and the law of antitrust.  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477 (1977); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36 (1977).  These cases are discussed, passim, below. 
 
5  Ergo, today’s antitrust students will never be exposed to supposed “issues” such as advertising as an impediment 
to competition, or the role of industrial concentration in monetary inflation, that those of us in the 1970s were.  For a 
sense of where the Old Testament ended and the New Testament began in antitrust, see Industrial Concentration: 
The New Learning (H. Goldschmid et al. eds. 1974).   
 
6 E.g., K. Clarkson & T. Muris (eds.), The Federal Trade Commission Since 1970: Economic Regulation and 
Bureaucratic Behavior (1981); Muris, California Dental Ass’n v. Federal Trade Commission: The Revenge of 
Footnote 17, 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 265 (2000).  For a superb summary of the changes in antitrust over the past 
generation, see Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, __ Geo. Mason  L. Rev. __ 
(200_) (hereinafter “Competition Policy”). 
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my contemporaries and teaching colleagues – such as Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner and 
Diane Wood -- now as judges apply the new law that they espoused as academics.   
This article describes aspects of the evolution by which new antitrust rules have emerged 
to stimulate the salutary (if incomplete) rapprochement between economics and law in antitrust. 
In effect, the new rules have emerged from various types of competition, of two general sorts.  
To invoke Harold Demsetz’s useful distinction, the competition has occurred in the field and for 
the field of antitrust.7  That is, the current generation has witnessed competition, first, as to which 
intellectual (including economic) paradigm animates antitrust law – competition for the field.  As 
Section I details, competition for the field has included competition in the federal judiciary, some 
of that competition represented by acts of seeming judicial disobedience in antitrust.  Thereafter, 
there has been considerable competition in the field, along lines to be described in section II, 
focusing on developments (some desirable, some not) in enforcement of the antitrust laws.   
 
I. Competition for the Antitrust Field 
 A. Intellectual Competition 
No body of law ever commands unanimity as to what it should achieve, and different 
groups predictably will vie to define the field.  However, the competition has been more 
vigorous in antitrust, because competing groups seeking to play the central roles in setting the 
antitrust agenda have included both lawyers and economists. Antitrust is somewhat unusual in 
law, in that its fundamental concepts supposedly parallel those of economics.  “Parallel” is too 
precise a term, however.  At times, economics informs antitrust.  At other times, economics has 
                                                 
7  Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J. Law & Econ. 55 (1968). 
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had little to say in antitrust cases, because the legal issues presented were ones whose 
competitive consequences economists had not thought about.  And so the law has had to develop 
on its own, with later-developing economics left to reclaim what it could, once it tackled the 
problems courts had already (for better or for worse) resolved for themselves.8   
Much of the past generation of antitrust has thus concerned intellectual competition 
among economists and competition-minded jurists as to what antitrust is supposed to be about.   
The principal provision of the Sherman Act, outlawing a “[e]very contract, combination…or 
conspiracy” that is “in restraint of trade,” defined none of those terms.9  Likewise, although 
making it illegal to “monopolize” (or attempt to “monopolize”), the Act did not define that term, 
either.10  The Act thus is quasi-constitutional, in that courts were left to flesh out from very 
skeletal language what would be deemed anticompetitive.11  The operative language of the other 
two important antitrust statutes, the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, is equally 
bare-bones.12 
                                                 
8  For more on the fitful overlaps between economics and competition law, see, e.g.,  McChesney, Antitrust, in The 
Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics (D. Henderson, ed. 1993); Kovacic and Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of 
Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 43 (2000). 
 
9  15 U.S.C. §1. 
 
10  15 U.S.C. §2. 
 
11  “Back in 1890 Senator Sherman and his colleagues protested the Sugar Trust and other malefactors and told the 
judiciary to do something about it.  They weren't sure just what.  Their statute does not contain a program; it is 
instead a blank check.” Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 48 U. Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1702 (1986) (hereinafter 
Workable Antitrust Policy).  See also Kovacic and Shapiro, supra note __, at 43 (referring to the Sherman Act’s 
“open-ended commands [by which] Congress gave federal judges extraordinary power to draw lines between 
acceptable cooperation and illegal collusion, between vigorous competition and unlawful monopolization”). 
 
12  The key substantive sections of the Clayton Act, sections 3 and 7 (15 U.S.C. §§14 & 18) forbid certain conduct 
when its effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”  The operative section 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares unlawful “unfair methods of competition.” 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1). 
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Ineluctably, then, lawyers and economists were left to figure out just what contracts, 
combinations or conspiracies were in restraint of trade, and what exactly constituted 
monopolizing behavior.  At sea for the most part, judges initially applied standards of per se 
illegality to almost any contract among horizontal competitors, to many agreements among 
vertical contractors, and to any price agreement among vertically-linked parties.13  Economists, 
who had not been very interested in legislating competition in the first place, did not disagree.14   
The prevailing per se views on contracts and practices like price-fixing, information exchanges, 
territorial allocations, and tying shifted over time.  Various sources have detailed the black-letter-
law developments as concern these specific areas of antitrust, and need not be detailed here.15   
Less fully appreciated have been the past generation’s more subtle alterations, not to the 
law of specific contracts or practices, but in the appropriate approach to antitrust analysis overall.  
Traditionally in antitrust, each sort of “contract, combination or conspiracy” or allegedly 
“monopolizing” practice has been treated as requiring a separate mode of analysis.  So, a 
separate body of case law specific to each contract or practice has been needed, as a review of 
any standard antitrust casebook or treatise reveals.  Areas of substantive antitrust importance are 
first  divided into several major categories: horizontal contracts under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, vertical contracts under that same section, monopolization and attempted monopolization 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, tying and exclusive dealing under section 3 of the Clayton 
Act, and mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act.  Contracts governed by section 1 of the 
                                                 
13  E.g., U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (price fixing among competitors); Eastern States 
Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. U.S. 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (boycotts); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & 
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (vertical price fixing). 
 
14  Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, in The Economist as Preacher and Other Essays (1982). 
 
15  See generally H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (2d ed. 1994). 
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Sherman Act are then sub-divided into price-fixing, boycotts (or concerted refusals to deal), and 
territorial allocation contracts – each one with different rules, depending on whether they are 
horizontal or vertical.16  Antitrust law until the mid-1970s sometimes felt like tax law, with 
various provisions and rules applying to different transactions, rather than a system directed to 
more fundamental notions of competition. 
Increasingly, however, disparate strands of antitrust law have coalesced to ignore this 
needless taxonomy, with its different cases and analyses for different contracts or practices.  
Rather, judges more and more are relying on a single model of competition applicable to 
practically all antitrust areas.  Justice O’Connor fired an important shot across the bow with her 
concurrence in the Jefferson Parish case.17   Particularized rules for each sort of contract or 
practice coming under the antitrust lens made no sense, she wrote.  Instead, she called for a 
unified approach to antitrust analysis, based on a common Rule-of-Reason approach that 
compares a practice’s economic benefits and costs.18   
The time has therefore come to abandon the “per se” label and refocus the 
inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic 
benefits, that the tie may have.  The law of tie-ins will thus be brought into 
accord with the law applicable to all other allegedly anticompetitive 
economic arrangements…. 
Lower courts have leapt at the invitation to combine antitrust’s disjointed jurisprudence 
into a single analytic model.  For example, in its (apparently) final Microsoft opinion, the D.C. 
Circuit interpreted the standards that should be applied under section 1 and section 2 of the 
                                                 
16  See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note __. 
 
17  Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
 
18  466 U.S. at __ (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Sherman Acts as a single test, a ruling as sensible as it would be surprising a generation ago.  
The court said that regardless of statutory origin, an antitrust challenge should be evaluated by 
competitive costs and benefits of the challenged practice, noting that other circuits had concluded 
equivalently in other circumstances.19   
The simplifying reasoning espoused by Justice O’Connor in Jefferson Parish and in 
lower appellate courts must inevitably percolate down to trial courts, and in fact already has.  
Noteworthy in this respect was the recent Visa/MasterCard case brought by the Justice 
Department.20   The Justice Department challenged several aspects of the Visa-MasterCard 
relationship, including restrictions by banks that own Visa and MasterCard as to who could sit on 
the boards of those two associations.  Under traditional antitrust jurisprudence, the challenged 
practices would first have to be characterized as (1) horizontal or vertical, next as (2) price or 
non-price contracts, and only then evaluated by the standards (per se or Rule of Reason) 
established in the cases appropriate to those pigeon-hole designations.  Instead, the district court 
ranged across the tests set out in many cases -- horizontal and vertical, price and non-price – in 
reaching its conclusions as to liability. 
                                                 
19  United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2001): 
In cases arising under §  1 of the Sherman Act, the courts routinely apply a similar 
balancing approach under the rubric of the "rule of reason." The source of the rule of 
reason is Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 L. Ed. 619, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911), 
in which the Supreme Court used that term to describe the proper inquiry under both 
sections of the Act. See id. at 61-62 ("When the second section [of the Sherman Act] is 
thus harmonized with ... the first, it becomes obvious that the criteria to be resorted to in 
any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section have been 
committed, is the rule of reason guided by the established law...."). As the Fifth Circuit 
more recently explained, "it is clear ... that the analysis under section 2 is similar to that 
under section 1 regardless whether the rule of reason label is applied...." Mid-Texas 
Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT & T, 615 F.2d 1372, 1389 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing 
Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 860 (6th Cir. 1979)); see also Cal. Computer 
Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 
20  United States v. Visa U.S.A., 163 F.Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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Growing coalescence of antitrust jurisprudence is emerging in other ways.  The 
Department of Justice / Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines were promulgated to 
explain how the enforcement agencies analyze proposed mergers.  However, over time, they 
have come to figure prominently in judicial determinations concerning liability in litigated 
cases.21  Indeed, the general Merger Guidelines model of analyzing competition is being adopted 
outside the area of mergers altogether.22  It remains to be seen how far this unification of antitrust 
analysis proceeds.  In some areas, it predictably will take longer.  Justice O’Connor’s plea for 
unity was written in a case involving tying, an area so confused by the Supreme Court’s last 
opinion that no prediction as to future jurisprudence can be made with any confidence.23   
Overall, however, the growing unification of antitrust evaluation has resolved a number 
of issues that had plagued antitrust for years.  First, the law has finally ended any intellectual 
competition about what the goals of antitrust are.  In particular, the debate whether antitrust is to 
pursue economic or social goals is over: economics has won.24   “Anticompetitive” now is 
                                                 
21  E.g., United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J); United States v. Syufy 
Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.) FTC v. PPG Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d 1500 (2nd Cir. 1986) 
(Bork, J.)  
 
22  E.g., Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995) (predatory pricing); Horst v. 
Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 917 F.Supp. 739 (D.Colo. 1996) (attempted monopolization).   
 
23  Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Jefferson Parish is at odds not just with the Court’s prior precedents but 
also with ordinary antitrust modes of analysis, such that lower courts have been uncertain what to make of it.  This 
point is discussed in Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors, 959, F.2d 468 (3rd Cir. 1992), in which 
Judge Becker doggedly attempts to implement Justice Stevens’ opinion, but notes that other lower courts have had 
less patience with it, as compared to the more straightforward application of the general antitrust standard set forth 
in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.  See, e.g., Grapppone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc, 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 
1988) (Breyer, J.) 
 
24  For an excellent discussion of what “competition” means generally, and particularly for purposes of antitrust law, 
see Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984) (hereinafter Limits of Antitrust); Workable 
Antitrust Policy, supra note __. 
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clearly defined as that which raises price, restricts quantity or lowers quality.25  Social goals such 
as maintaining large numbers of smaller, less efficient firms in the market have largely been 
repudiated.26  Courts’ focus on the economics of antitrust represents a triumph for the “Chicago 
School” approach to antitrust.27  The Chicago antitrust focus on price, quantity and quality is 
now accepted as the norm in antitrust.28 
Of course, analysis of the price, quantity and quality effects of business contracts and 
practices is the very stuff of economics.  But any ability to use that analysis in the antitrust 
domain required a second development that has characterized the past generation of antitrust: the 
demise of per se rules of illegality and concomitant rise of the Rule of Reason as the dominant 
mode of antitrust analysis.29  The seemingly impregnable fortress of per se rules erected during 
                                                 
25  E.g., U.S. v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, __ (3d Cir. 1993): “The plaintiff bears an initial burden under the rule 
of reason of showing that the alleged combination or agreement produced adverise, anticompetitive effects within 
the relevant product and geographic markets. The plaintiff may satisfy this burden by proving the existence of actual 
anticompetitive effects, such as reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality of goods or 
services.” 
 
26  Few if any courts today, for example, would agree with Judge Learned Hand’s statement that “great industrial 
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results,” and that one purpose of antitrust law 
was “to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small 
unit….”  U.S. v. Aluminum co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, __  (2d Cir. 1945).  Likewise, the concern expressed in 
the Trans-Missouri case for preserving the livelihoods of  “small dealers and worthy men” would be unlikely to 
count in a modern antitrust case. 
 
27  For summaries of the “Chicago School” approach to antitrust, see Kovacic and Shapiro, supra note __, at 52-55; 
McChesney, Be True to Your School: Chicago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in The Causes 
and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective (F. McChesney & W. Shughart II, eds., 2000). 
 
28 
 Should the antitrust laws seek to enhance competition by maintaining an atomistic 
structure, in which numerous small businesses compete, or should it aim to maximize 
consumer welfare?  A crude but fair summary of the development of antitrust law is that 
courts have shifted, though gradually, from an adherence to the former to an acceptance of 
the latter.   
 
K. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution 40 (2003).  For a lengthier discussion, see  
Joskow, The Role of Transactions Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulation, 7 J. L. Econ. & Org. 
__ (1991).   
 
29  See, e.g., Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note __, at  9-10 (referring to “the shrinking per se rule”). 
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the years of Justice Douglas’ pivotal antitrust role on the Court crumbled quickly after his 
departure.30  True, Justice Douglas’ views are still represented, at least to some extent, by Justice 
Stevens.31  And not all areas of per se treatment have been eradicated.32  But in the past 
generation, lower courts have found ways to minimize the harm done by mistaken per se rules.  
Indeed, competition from lower courts has sped the demise of bad antitrust and rise of better 
antitrust. 
B. Judicial Competition 
 1. Case Law Competition 
By the mid-1970s, faced with per se Supreme Court pronouncements that were blatantly 
nonsensical from the standpoint of competition, American lower-court judges fought back in 
various ways.  Some lower courts have respected the judicial hierarchy, applying misguided 
Supreme Court precedents while imploring the Court to reverse them.  Perhaps the most famous 
example is Judge Posner’s opinion in Khan v. State Oil Co., concerning the setting of maximum 
resale prices.33  Posner criticized as “unsound” existing Supreme Court law making vertical 
maximum-price fixing per se illegal, noting that the prior rulings rested economically on 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
30  E.g., compare  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (Douglas, J.) (horizontal price 
fixing illegal per se) with Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (White, J.) 
(horizontal price fixing not per se illegal). 
31  Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding the fixing of prices at which 
insurance companies would reimburse doctors per se illegal); see also Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. 
Hyde, supra note __ (“It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that 
certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable “per 
se.”). 
 
32  The most egregious example concerns resale price maintenance. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John d. Park & Sons, 
220 U.S. 373 (1911).  See also United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), discussed further, 
infra. 
 
33  Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996).   
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“increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations.”  But, he held, as an appellate judge he was 
bound by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Albrecht v. Herald Co. that maximum price fixing was 
illegal per se.34  
Yet Posner ultimately had his cake and ate it, too. The Supreme Court congratulated 
Judge Posner for applying stare decisis, despite his disagreement with the prior Court case: “it is 
this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”35   The Court then overruled 
Albrecht.   
Pointing out error and inviting superior courts to amend it is the textbook method of 
correcting legal error.  Judge Posner’s approach differs from that of other Chicagoans, however, 
whose techniques have less to with The Bramble Bush or The Art of Legal Reasoning than with 
judicial nullification of (admittedly undesirable) Supreme Court precedent.  At the other end of 
the spectrum from Judge Posner’s approach in Khan has been lower courts’ pretending that there 
is no Supreme Court decision of relevance in the first place.   
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Polk Brothers, Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. is a 
noteworthy example.36  Technically, by standard antitrust pigeonholing, the agreement between 
the two parties constituted a horizontal territorial allocation, each firm agreeing to cede the 
“territory” for certain products to the other.37  Territorial allocations are per se illegal under the 
                                                 
34  Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 
35  Kahn v. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. 3, __ (1997).   
 
36  776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).   
 
37  Plaintiff Forest City specialized in lumber, tools and building materials; defendant Polk Brothers in home 
appliances and furnishings.  But both sold, as minor lines, the products in which the other specialized.  As part of a 
larger agreement to develop a site at which each would establish a new store, the parties agreed that neither would 
offer products in which the other specialized. 
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 12
Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.38  And so, when Forest City 
informed Polk Brothers that it would no longer honor its agreement and Polk Brothers sought an 
injunction to compel performance, the district court held that the agreement was illegal per se. 
On appeal, Judge Easterbrook explained why such an agreement was presumptively a 
good thing.  But under Topco, good things would be irrelevant; the contract would be per se 
illegal.  Nonetheless, Judge Easterbrook did the economically honorable thing, reversing the 
district court without ever discussing, or even citing, Topco.39  Similar acts of unabashed judicial 
nullification in the face of robotic per se rulings from the Supreme Court have been routine in 
other areas of antitrust.40 
Between Posnerian deferential invitations to revisit mistaken rules and Easterbrookian 
refusals to recognize the rules in the first place, other lower-court cases have worked around 
undesirable Supreme Court holdings by artfully distinguishing the Court’s rulings.  Two ploys 
have been employed.  In the first, the lower court notes that seemingly binding precedent comes 
from older cases – as all precedent must.  The court then decides that, if the current Supreme 
Court were now deciding a similar case, it would adopt a different rule.  The lower court then 
                                                 
38  405 U.S. 596 (1972).  As far as the Supreme Court is concerned,  horizontal territorial allocations are still illegal 
per se.  Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam).  Compare the holding in Polk Brothers 
with that in General Leaseways v. National Truck Leasing Assn., 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (holding 
territorial allocation illegal per se under Topco). 
 
39  On the issue of judicial law-making in the pursuit of sensible economics, see Buchanan, Good Economics – Bad 
Law, __ Va. L. Rev. __ (1974). 
 
40  For example, until 1985 horizontal boycotts were judged under a per se rule if the case made it as far as the 
Supreme Court.  Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Fashion 
Originators’ Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207n (1959).  Meanwhile, lower courts ignored the Court,  using common sense in upholding 
boycotts that made economic sense.  For a lengthy discussion of the cases, see R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, supra 
note __, at 330-46. 
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resolves the current dispute “as if” the Supreme Court had abandoned its prior rule in favor of a 
more economically-informed alternative. 
So, for example, then-Judge Bork discussed horizontal non-price contracts (like those at 
issue in Topco) in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines.41   Plaintiff Rothery challenged 
various aspects of the way Atlas organized its operations, which required cooperation among 
competing movers using the Atlas name.  “The business arrangement in Topco very closely 
resembles Atlas’ policy,” Judge Bork wrote for the D.C. Circuit panel.42  Thus, if Topco and 
other horizontal-restraint cases controlled, “the restraints imposed by Atlas would appear to be a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act.”  However, Judge Bork concluded, “examination of more 
recent Supreme Court decisions” indicated that those cases (including Topco) “must be regarded 
as effectively overruled.”43  Treating these cases “as if” they had been overruled, Judge Bork 
held that the horizontal contracts at issue in Rothery did not violate the Sherman Act. 
An alternative to arguing the law is arguing the facts.  And so, as an alternative to treating 
undesirable precedent as “effectively overruled,” lower courts sometimes just distinguish the 
facts of their cases from the facts in the case on which the Court opined.  In Continental T.V., 
Inc.  v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,44 for example, the Supreme Court noted much lower-court hostility 
to its per se ruling ten years earlier in Arnold, Schwinn & Co. v. United States, a case involving 
non-price vertical restraints.45  Opposition to Schwinn was clear from the appellate ruling in the 
                                                 
41  792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 
42  792 F.2d at __.  The panel included then-Chief Judge Patricia Wald and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 
 
43  792 F.2d at __. 
 
44 433 U.S. 367 (1977). 
 
45  388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
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Sylvania case.  The Ninth Circuit had distinguished Schwinn on several grounds, all essentially 
factual, and thus held that the matter before it should be judged under the Rule of Reason rather 
than the per se standard dictated by Schwinn.  In addition, as the Supreme Court noted,  “the 
[Ninth Circuit] found support for its position in the…decisions of other federal courts involving 
non-price vertical restrictions.”46  The Supreme Court disagreed with the various attempts to 
distinguish Schwinn, stating that these distinctions “have no basis” in that case.47   However, 
faced with large-scale judicial nullification of Schwinn in the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
noted that its prior per se ruling had little economic justification, and so concluded that the case 
“must be overruled.”48   Leading from the rear, in effect, the Court just validated what lower 
courts had already been doing with bad Supreme Court precedent. 
 2. Type I and Type II Errors 
Judicial competition for the field in antitrust has been increasingly influenced by courts’ 
recognition of the harm that misguided antitrust can inflict.  The early days of per se dominance 
in antitrust reasoning in effect posited that there was little reason to worry if courts were wrong 
in outlawing a problem.  In the classic apologia for per se rules, Justice Black opined that some 
agreements, “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue 
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable”49   If a contract or practice can only be bad, there 
is little problem in proscribing it.  Per se rules essentially mean there is no error cost associated 
with banning a certain contract or practice.  The only error would be in not outlawing it. 
                                                 
46  433 U.S. at __. 
 
47  433 U.S. 33 at __ n.12. 
 
48  433 U.S. at __. 
 
49  Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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More recently, however, antitrust courts have recognized that there are two types of error 
to be considered, only one of which enters into per se reasoning.  Type I error refers to a “false 
positive,” analogous in the legal context to mistakenly imposing liability on an innocent 
defendant.  Type II error is a “false negative,” or failing to punish a guilty party.  Each type of 
error has a cost associated with it.  Because judges (like everyone else) are human, their 
decisions will sometimes be wrong.  If a decision can never be correct with certainty, there is 
always some possibility of error in deciding one way or another.  Optimally, decisions would be 
made so as to minimize the costs of being wrong.  That decision standard is reflected in courts’ 
choice of burdens of proof in different kinds of cases.50     
The trade-off between Type I and Type II error is common to all of law.  But antitrust is 
different in one respect.  Type II errors (failing to penalize anticompetitive contracts and 
practices) will be low, as long as entry barriers into markets plagued by suspected 
anticompetition are also low.  As prices rise because of anticompetitive contracts or practices, 
new entrants emerge to alleviate or even eradicate the problem.  Letting the guilty go free in 
antitrust is generally a self-correcting problem.51 
                                                 
50  As Justice Harlan wrote, “a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the 
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions.”  In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970).  The liability standard in civil cases, requiring merely “a preponderance of the evidence,” 
makes a plaintiff’s victory relatively easy, which will entail more Type I error but less Type II error.  But criminal 
liability standards like “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” mean that prosecutors will win less often, which produces 
more Type II error (failing to punish the guilty) but more Type I error (punishing the innocent).  The different 
standards reflect a sense that Type I error costs (jail, or even execution, for the innocent) are relatively high in 
criminal matters, relative to those (money damages, typically) in civil cases. For an excellent discussion recognizing 
(albeit without using the terms) the different error costs associated with different liability standards, see United 
States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 
51  If entry barriers are high, that is, if it is too costly for others to enter a market characterized by “high” prices, the 
firm with market power already in the market in effect has a natural monopoly.  But antitrust is poorly suited to 
solve any problems associated with natural monopoly, which ordinarily are resolved through price regulation.  See 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.)  See generally 
Hovenkamp, supra note __, at 31-36.  
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Type I error, however, is not subject to much self-correction.  If liability is imposed on 
conduct that actually is beneficial (that is, competitive innocents are punished), there is no 
market corrective for judicial mistake.  Only judicial reversal of the case or legislative 
intervention to change the decision will undo the Type I error.52 
Antitrust developments of the past twenty-five years demonstrate growing awareness of 
the importance of the distinction between Type I and Type II error costs, with the balance 
shifting toward giving greater weight to the former.  Traditionally, not only were Type I error 
costs treated as minimal (as reflected by the dominance of per se rules), but legislative correction 
was treated -- or at last given lip service -- as one reason not to be overly concerned about Type I 
error,53  even though it never occurred.  All that began to change a generation ago. 
First, the importance of Type II error itself began to receive attention.  Not surprisingly, 
courts have become increasingly concerned about punishing behavior that supposedly leads to 
                                                 
52  See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note __, at 2-3: 
 
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good.  Any other 
firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the 
benefits.  If the court errs by permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases 
over time.  Monopoly is self-destructive.  Monopoly vices eventually attract entry. 
 
53 E.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, __ (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring): 
 
As the opinion for the Court demonstrates, we have long held that tying 
arrangements are subject to evaluation for per se illegality under §1 of the 
Sherman Act. Whatever merit the policy arguments against this longstand-
ing construction of the Act might have, Congress, presumably aware of our 
decisions, has never changed the rule by amending the Act. In such 
circumstances, our practice usually has been to stand by a settled 
statutory interpretation and leave the task of modifying the statute’s reach 
to Congress. I see no reason to depart from that principle in this case and 
therefore join the opinion and judgment of the Court. 
 
See also U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (although the Court’s per 
se opinion has its “anomalous aspects,” in that it actually will “stultify” competition, the “per se rule now appears to 
be so firmly established by the Court that, at this late date, I could not oppose it.  Relief, if any is to be forthcoming, 
apparently must be by way of legislation.”)   
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lower prices.54  Courts have also reflected demonstrated increased awareness of the self-
correcting nature of Type II problems, that is, the ability of markets to correct judicial failure to 
stop behavior that truly is anticompetitive.55 
Sensitivity to error has increasingly gone beyond just the substance of antitrust opinions.  
Optimal minimization of error requires not just rules that are substantively sound, but also ones  
relatively easy for other courts to apply correctly.  For one court to get it right, using a mode of 
analysis that later courts will misapply and so get it wrong, is patently undesirable.  And thus, 
courts increasingly look for rules that are relatively foolproof in their application.  In an opinion 
remarkably sophisticated for its treatment of the economics of successive monopoly, then-Judge 
Breyer preceded his analysis with an encomium for simple rules: 
We shall take account of the institutional fact that antitrust rules are court-
administered rules.  They must be clear enough for lawyers to explain them 
to clients.  They must be administratively workable and therefore cannot 
always take account of every complex economic circumstance or 
qualification….They must be designed with the knowledge that firms 
ultimately act, not in precise conformity with the literal language of 
complex rules, but in reaction to what they see as the likely outcome of 
court proceedings.56 
                                                 
54  E.g., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 
(7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 914 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.). 
 
55  E.g., United States v. Waste Management, Inc., supra note __.  
 
56  Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, __  (1st Cir. 1990).  In the same vein, the current Chairman 
of the Federal Trade Commission extols “administrability” as a goal for antitrust: “The suitability of an economic 
hypothesis for shaping antitrust doctrine should be measured by  whether the hypothesis lends itself to the 
development of standards that courts and enforcement agencies can administer effectively.”  Muris, Competition 
Policy, supra note __, at __.   
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Concern about how judges will apply antitrust precedent extends as well to misgivings about 
antitrust remedies that constitute de facto regulatory regimes, which in turn reflects concern for 
antitrust causes of action that would require courts to take continuing jurisdiction, such as the 
“essential facilities” doctrine.57 
 Concerns about Type I versus Type II errors, plus the problems of judicial application of 
overly complex antitrust principles, explain a major non-development in the past generation of 
antitrust: the fact that “post-Chicago” economic approaches to antitrust have had no important 
impact in the courts.  Post-Chicago economics “relies on game-theoretic concepts, which 
emphasize strategic behavior among economic agents.”58   The game-theoretic approaches 
typically rely on repeated interaction over time among competing firms, and among firms and 
purchasers.59  Behavior that would make no sense economically if part of a one-time-only 
strategy, such as a predatory pricing,60 can be shown more sensible as part of a repeated-strategy 
game.61. 
 The likelihood that post-Chicago economics, using more complicated game-theoretic 
models to provide new bases for plaintiff recoveries, seemed especially high following the 
                                                 
57  See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, supra note __.   See generally 
Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note __, at 35 n.72; Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: 
An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 997 (1986); Wilke & Gruley, “Acquisitions Can Mean 
Long-Lasting Scrutiny by Antitrust Agencies,” Wall St. J., March 4, 1997, p. A1. 
 
58  Coate & Fischer,  Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert? 34 Akron L. Rev. 795 (2001).  “Antitrust in 
the 1990s has been heavily influenced by the thinking of the Post-Chicago school of scholars.” Id. at 795. 
  
59  For further discussion and relevant citations, see Hylton, supra note __, at 76-77, 224-28. 
 
60  The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed skepticism that predatory pricing is rational maximizing strategy.  
Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 
Inc., 479 U.s. 104 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 
61 Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 162 (1993); 
Ordover and Saloner, Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust, in The Handbook of Industrial Organization (R. 
Schmalansee and R Willig, eds.) (1989). 
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Supreme Court’s opinion in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services.62  But Kodak has been 
very narrowly interpreted by lower courts, which have again shown wariness of seeming broad 
Supreme Court pronouncements.63  More generally, the complexity of game-theoretic 
approaches has made them unattractive to modern antitrust judges, anxious for simple rules and 
worried about how complexity produces Type I error.  In the one area where economists’ game-
                                                 
62  504 U.S. 451 (1992).  The case is recognized as ‘[p]erhaps the most important modern judicial use of game 
theory, the econmics of information, and transaction cost economics.”  Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note __, at 56.  At 
one level, Kodak seemed a routine tying case, in which Kodak required the use of Kodak service personnel as a 
condition for getting Kodak replacement parts when Kodak copiers needed service.  The case involved Kodak’s 
refusal to make available to independent service organizations (“ISOs”) replacement parts needed to service Kodak 
copiers. 
 
Kodak initially sold copiers and made repair parts available to the ISOs that specialized in 
servicing Kodak equipment. Thus, Kodak customers had three choices for service: repair 
and maintain the copiers themselves, hire Kodak to service the machines, or retain an ISO 
to keep their equipment functional. In 1985, Kodak changed its open policy and refused to 
sell to ISOs. Kodak also pressured original equipment manufacturers, parts distributors, 
and equipment owners not to make Kodak parts available to ISOs. Without access to parts, 
ISOs had difficulty competing and thus lost share. The ISOs charged that Kodak's behavior 
amounted to actual and/or attempted monopolization. In particular, conditioning the 
purchase of Kodak parts on the use of Kodak services was alleged to be tying. In contrast, 
Kodak claimed that its behavior simply amounted to competition in the copier market.  
 
Coate and Fischer, supra note __, at 838.  But the supposed source of gain to Kodak lay in its ability to fool 
customers over time: customers who thought they would get allegedly lower-price service on their copiers from non-
Kodak personnel found – after they bought a Kodak copier – that the lower-priced service was not available.   
 
63  “At first, it seemed that Kodak might transform jurisprudence governing dominant firm conduct…Since 1992, 
however, lower court decisions have tended to limit Kodak’s application to a relatively demanding set of 
conditions.”  Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note __, at__.  Post-Kodak courts have distinguished between (a) 
buyer willingness to contract into a situation whose consequences were readily foreseeable, 
versus (b) buyers being “forced” later to adapt to changes in the buyer-seller relationship they 
arguably would not have foreseen until after they were “locked in.” E.g., compare Hack v. Yale 
College, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000); with Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton 
College, 128 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1997).  See also Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 
124 F.3d 430 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Kodak inapplicable where plaintiffs were “forced” to purchase 
related products only because of voluntary contractual requirements); Chawla v. Shell Oil Co., 
75 F.Supp.2d 626 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (requirement that service station dealers use a particular 
system for credit card sales not illegal because the source of alleged power— “uniqueness” of 
tying product [seller’s gasoline]—was due solely to contractual agreement).   
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theoretic approaches seemingly offered new possibilities for plaintiff victories, predatory pricing, 
the post-Chicago approach has failed to deliver. 
Where in all of the judiciary’s elaboration of the law of predatory pricing 
are the insights of the [post-Chicago] market-organization literatures on 
predation?  Nowhere.  The equilibrium models of predatory pricing 
developed in the last dozen years or so have not had an impact on the 
developing antitrust law of predatory pricing….The lack of impact that the 
recent equilibrium models of predation have had on the development of 
antitrust law concerning predatory pricing is unfortunate.  The major cases 
on predatory pricing have been particularly concerned with the rationality of 
predation by a dominant firm.  They have not heeded, however, the lessons 
of the recent microeconomics literature that suggest a possible role for price 
predation in a dynamic strategic context.64 
 
To say that game-theoretic approaches “have not had an impact” is an understatement.  The 
Supreme Court has been candidly skeptical of their value.65  
In an antitrust order increasingly recognizant of economic learning, why has post-
Chicago economics had so little impact?  Given the increasing concerns about Type I error and 
                                                 
64  Klevorick, supra note __, at 165-66. 
 
65  In Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), its last predatory pricing 
case, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s game theory model as implausible: 
However unlikely predatory pricing by multiple firms may be when they conspire, it is 
even less likely when, as here, there is no express coordination. Firms that seek to recoup 
predatory losses through the conscious parallelism of oligopoly must rely on uncertain and 
ambiguous signals to achieve concerted action. The signals are subject to misinterpretation 
and are a blunt and imprecise means of ensuring smooth cooperation, especially in the 
context of changing or unprecedented market circumstances. This anticompetitive minuet 
is most difficult to compose and to perform, even for a disciplined oligopoly. 
 
509 U.S. at 227-28. 
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concomitant desire for simplicity in liability rules, post-Chicago economics cannot be an easy 
sell.  Consider one description of its basic approach: 
[T]he market organization literature [began] to see an infusion of 
contributions that used modern game-theoretical concepts and techniques to 
analyze well-specified models of strategic firm behavior in oligopolistic 
markets….A central feature of this class of models is some asymmetry of 
information between market actors.  The dominant incumbent firm is better 
informed than its smaller rival in models where the predator induces exit of 
competitors; the incumbent is better informed than potential entrants in 
models where predation takes the form of entry deterrence; and firms in 
general are better informed about their prospects than are their sources of 
financing.66 
 
Another summary of the post-Chicago, game-theoretic approach, explains more pointedly the 
problem for antitrust courts. 
                                                 
66  Klevorick, supra note __, at 162.   Two other economists elaborate on the above: 
 
Post-Chicago Economics (PCE) stems from the proposition that mathematical modeling, in 
the form of game theory, would provide a useful underpinning for antitrust analysis. This 
school generally focuses on strategic behavior of firms. Instead of focusing on the basic 
competitive interactions of the market, these models show how firms can enhance or 
protect their market power by incorporating specific strategies, and the reactions of their 
rivals, into a complex equilibrium analysis. Although there are notable exceptions, the 
mathematical models underpinning these theories tended to be developed in the economics 
departments of academic institutions before they were adopted by antitrust practitioners. 
The models start with the Chicago school's proposition that economics controls antitrust, 
but then they add complexity to the microeconomic analysis that seeks to generate a 
collection of special case results. These results are then linked to traditional antitrust 
doctrine as examples of anticompetitive conduct. The insights can be considered almost 
normative because of the special nature of the assumptions. If you believe that the world 
follows a particular mathematical model, then certain antitrust policies should be followed. 
Many PCE adherents appear to distrust market outcomes and believe instead that 
government regulation is necessary to rein in the natural tendency of firms to acquire and 
exploit market power. n71 Proponents of PCE take a broad view of PCE theories, 
suggesting that they describe how the world can really function. n72 The only thing the 
PCE theorists must do is check the assumptions. This, of course, will turn out to be the real 
trick.  
Coate and Fischer, supra note __, at 812-13 (citations omitted). 
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Game-theoretic methods dominated industrial organization theory in the 
1970s and 1980s.  The flexibility of game theory allowed economic 
theorists to generate equilibrium predictions in settings involving a wide 
range of conduct….However, the same flexibility made general predictions 
hard to come by.  Some types of conduct, such as long term contracts with 
key customers or preemptive capacity expansion, could  deter entry and 
entrench dominance, but they also could generate efficiencies.  The only 
way to tell in a given case appeared to be for the antitrust agencies and the 
courts to conduct a full-scale rule of reason inquiry.67 
 
In short, it is hard enough for courts “to determine what is ‘efficient’ using a simple model” 
of competition.68  But if so, Judge Easterbrook has asked, “how are courts going to decide cases 
based on complex, strategic models?”69  The answer, surely, is that they will do so badly, with 
considerable amounts of more costly Type I error.  The error costs must be all the higher when 
the game-theoretic economic models themselves do not generate consistent answers.  Judicial 
error costs are avoided by more simple rules, as courts themselves apparently have realized. 
 
II. Competition in the Field 
The foregoing has summarized a number of trends in the past generation of antitrust law.  
At the moment at least, a new equilibrium seems to have been established, one different from 
that prevailing until the mid-1970s.  However, even in the new equilibrium, there is ongoing 
                                                 
67  Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note __, at 55.  See also Muris, Competition Policy, supra note __, at __ (citation 
omitted): “there have been relatively few successful efforts to translate the mathematically elaborate, game theoretic 
models into administrable antitrust rule or analytical techniques to support enforcement.” 
 
68  Easterbrook, Workable Competition, supra note __, at 1700. 
 
69  Easterbrook, Workable Competition, supra note __, at 1700. 
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competition within the field of antitrust.  The competition is of two sorts, dealing with matters of 
antitrust substance and antitrust enforcement.  Substantive competition arises primarily from 
property-rights considerations that vie with fundamental antitrust concepts, even as those 
concepts have become clearer over the past generation.  Enforcement competition comes from 
two groups that traditionally have not figured prominently in the world of antitrust, state antitrust 
enforcers and  international enforcers. 
A. Antitrust and Property 
The standard antitrust paradigm, even in the current era where price (or, reciprocally, 
quantity) is the principal focus, takes for granted that property rights are well defined and 
enforced.  While that assumption may be warranted in the typical case, it does not apply across 
the board.  And when it does not, the antitrust model has proven difficult to apply, sometimes 
leading to perverse applications.   
The tension between antitrust and property is well understood in the context of 
intellectual property.  Legal protections afforded by patents, copyrights and trademarks 
recognize that creation and enforcement of intellectual property entails a separate cost – the item 
must not only be produced but first created – that does not apply to the standard widget.  If so, 
prices above marginal production costs must be charged as an incentive to compensate for the 
fixed costs of creating  the good in the first place.70  The higher prices necessarily result in lower 
quantities sold, compared to a price covering just production costs as in the standard economic 
model of competition.   
                                                 
70  E.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 44-45 (5th ed. 1998). 
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In effect, antitrust law is static: the good is there in the market, and the economic goal of 
the law is maximization of social welfare by maximizing quantities produced (or minimizing 
price), with the optimal amount dictated by given demand and marginal production cost curves.  
Intellectual property law is more dynamic, because it starts from a chronologically anterior state 
of the world: first the good must be created, and only then are there demand and production-cost 
curves of any relevance.  This distinction between the static model with well defined property 
rights and a more dynamic model that takes into account the need to create assets first would 
seem self-evident.  But traditionally it has not been self-evident to antitrust enforcers.  In the 
field of intellectual property, for example, “the history of the Department of Justice enforcement 
has been one of almost unbroken hostility towards patents.”71 
Although the property-antitrust dichotomy arises most frequently in the area of 
intellectual property such as patents, it is perhaps best illustrated in the context of more 
traditional property rights.  Take the standard economic example, the fishery.72  Typically, fish 
are found in “open access,” owned by no one until they are actually caught.  Because access to a 
lake, stream or ocean is open, over-fishing is a well recognized problem.73  The equally well-
recognized solution to this so-called “tragedy of the commons” is some form of ownership, 
either communal or completely private.74  With private ownership, over-fishing ends.75 
                                                 
71  Rule, Patent-Antitrust Policy: Looking Back and Ahead, 59 Antit. L.J. 729, 733 (1991) 
 
72  The literature is vast.  For the seminal contribution, see Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property 
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 124 (1954).  See generally T. Anderson & F. McChesney, eds. Property 
Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law (2003). 
 
73  E.g., Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist 106-08 (2001). 
 
74  Again, the literature is large, beginning with Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968). 
 
75  For further and more precise discussion of these points, see Anderson and McChesney, supra note __, at 59-72. 
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But in an antitrust world where low prices and high quantities are the goal, establishment 
of property rights is an objectionable solution.  Property rights mean the exclusion of some 
fishers and ending exploitation of the open-access resource.  As quantities taken diminish, prices 
naturally rise, a result striking at the core values of modern antitrust.  To antitrusters, the result is 
particularly objectionable when, as is often the case, the solution to over-exploitation of 
resources available in open access requires a collective agreement among competing fishermen 
to reduce their catch.  Then, it is a “contract, combination or conspiracy” employed “in restraint 
of trade,” with restricted quantities and higher prices.  In the static antitrust world, Sherman Act 
liability would follow. 
And so it has when private agreements have attempted to solve the tragedy of the 
commons.76  The Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Association (GCSOA) was a private 
organization that regulated shrimp harvests along the Mississippi cost of the Gulf of Mexico.  Its 
members agreed also to sell only to certain packers, who would pay GCSOA packers a minimum 
price. The Justice Department ended the GSSOA’s private definition of property rights in a 
criminal action brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act.77 
And so, an attempt to define private property, thus avoiding the economic waste created 
by open access, resulted in a criminal conviction.  The grand-daddy of all criminal price fixing 
cases likewise involved a collective attempt to solve property rights problems concerning open-
access resources, with the participants likewise convicted under section 1.78  Private treble-
                                                 
76  See Yandle, Antitrust and the Commons, Cooperation or Collusion? 3 The Independent Rev. 37 (1998); Adler, 
Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries (manuscript 2002). 
 
77  Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass’n v. United States, 236 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1956).  For further discussion 
see Adler, supra note __, at 23-25; G. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights 88-90 (1989). 
 
78  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra note __. 
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damage actions against collective attempts to create property rights naturally produce a chilling 
effect.  Discussing cases, Jonathan Adler writes that past antitrust actions against private 
organizations establishing property rights have created “a powerful incentive for fishers to stay 
well clear of those activities which could run afoul of antitrust laws.  Surveying self-governance 
arrangements in fisheries, Ralph Townsend encountered substantial reluctance by fishers in the 
U.S. and Canada to discuss such arrangements for fear of government regulation or 
prosecution.”79 
Just as it has been hostile to private creation of property – intellectual or marine – so has 
antitrust enforcement been hostile to private enforcement of property rights.80  To cite some of 
the better known cases, the government has attacked manufacturers’ collective attempts to 
safeguard their contract rights against fraud,81 to protect their original fabric designs from being 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
79  Adler, supra note __, at 27-28, citing Townsend, Producer Organizations and Agreements in Fisheries: 
Integrating Regulation and Coasian Bargaining, in Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries (D. Leal, ed., 
forthcoming). 
 
80  On private enforcement of property rights, see generally Anderson and McChesney, supra note __, passim.  For 
classic and still influential discussion of the subject, see Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California 
Gold Rush, 20 J. L.& Econ. 421 (1977); Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial 
Distribution of Property Rights, 19 Econ. Inq. 38 (1981). 
 
81  Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588.  In that case, competing cement 
manufacturers  agreed to exchange information, including price information, to protect themselves from being 
defrauded by purchasers with whom they had signed requirements contracts at a set price for cement.  When the spot 
price of cement rose, purchasers ordered more than their requirements to take advantage of the price at which they 
could purchase from the manufacturers relative to the spot price in the market.  The case thus involved recognition 
that contracts, once concluded, create property rights between the contracting parties, rights that the common law 
protects through liability and disgorgement remedies for tortious interference with contract.  See McChesney, 
Tortious Interference versus Efficient-Breach of Contract: Theory and Statistical Evidence, 28 J. Legal Stud. (1999).  
Protecting oneself against tortious interference with one’s contracts does not insulate against antitrust liability, 
however. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).  Justice Holmes dissent in this 
case is particularly notable for highlighting the interplay between tortious interference with contract and antitrust. 
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copied by pirates,82 or to prevent reverse engineering of machinery protected by a web of patents 
and unpatented trade secrets.83   
Analyses that would reconcile property (including intellectual) law with antitrust, though 
voluminous, thus have not succeeded in resolving the essential puzzles.84  Although complex 
reasons are often offered for the incompatibility of the two systems, simple reasons suffice.  Both 
intellectual property and antitrust law (as considered today) supposedly seek to maximize social 
welfare, net of costs.  But one system (antitrust) maximizes welfare in a short-run static sense.  
The other (property) is based on the claim that short-run losses from higher prices are necessary 
for the long-run existence of the good, and so benefits will ultimately exceed costs.  Thus, 
comparison of welfare benefits net of costs under the two models must by definition be an 
empirical exercise, comparing streams of benefits and costs over time, appropriately discounted 
for the time-value of money and for the risks of attaining the supposed net benefits. 
By itself, comparison of the relative benefits and costs of a contract or practice 
challenged under the Rule of Reason in antitrust law also requires an empirical reckoning of 
relative benefit and cost magnitudes, appropriately discounted for time and risk. The need for 
sound quantitative information is one of the “fundamental points” of a desirable antitrust 
                                                 
82  Fashion Originators Guild of American v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 668 (1941) (FOGA).  The Guild 
organized a boycott of clothing retailers who sold dresses with designs “pirated” from those created by Guild 
members.  A sometimes overlooked feature of the Court’s FOGA decision is its statement that self-help as employed 
by the dress designers was illegal, even if the style piracy constituted a business tort.  “Even if copying were an 
acknowledged tort under the law of every state, that situation would not justify petitioners in combining together to 
regulate and restrain interstate commerce in violation of federal law.” 312 U.S. at __.  
 
83  United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). 
 
84  For a good, recent  summary of the arguments and a detailed list of references, see Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-
Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (2002).  “The intersection of the patent and antitrust laws presents a 
formidable paradox….  Courts and commentators have struggled, unsuccessfully, with the patent-antitrust paradox 
for generations.”  Id. at 761, 854.  See also Langenfeld, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps Toward Striking a 
Balance, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 91 (2001). 
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enforcement policy, as Frank Easterbrook writes.85  Yet, Judge Easterbrook notes, determining 
actual economic benefit is difficult or impossible in antitrust cases.86  The data demands are too 
great – even if judges and juries would know what to do with the data, were it available. 
Even the few academic attempts to posit theoretically some sort of comparative welfare 
basis for evaluating the gains and losses of property protection versus antitrust liability brush 
over the empirical intractability of implementing any such comparison.87  But clearly, the 
empirical demands for measuring net benefits in relatively static antitrust cases are less than 
those in more dynamic property-rights settings.  In short, however soluble the theoretical 
difficulties of reconciling the legal regimes of intellectual property and antitrust, finding practical 
legal solutions in any given situation presents intractable empirical problems. 
Thus, even the much improved, Chicago version of antitrust cannot reconcile dynamic 
property-creation issues with static antitrust notions of wealth maximization.  Collective 
measures that create and enforce property rights are presumptively good.  But they necessarily 
result in restricted quantities and higher prices.  Antitrust attempts to keep prices down and 
quantities up dilute incentives to create and enforce new property rights.  What is best in any 
particular situation requires empirical data which cannot be expected to emerge, at least not in 
the context of litigation. 
                                                 
85  Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note __, at 1701. “No question should be answered without adequate data.  The 
best data and answers come from a study of the practice.  The nextbest answers come from extrapolations and 
interpolations from existing data.”  Id. 
 
86  Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note __, at 17. 
 
87  The most-cited attempt at balancing the relative net benefits of intellectual property versus antitrust is perhaps the 
“ratio test” proposed by  Louis Kaplow.  Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersectoin: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 
1813 (1984). 
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What of the suggestion that non-quantitative tests be employed, at least in an initial 
evaluation of the worthiness of any antitrust allegation?  In an important article, Frank 
Easterbrook suggested that antitrust embrace a series of “filters” in separating competition from 
anticompetition, two of which would be required in any antitrust case.  “First, the plaintiff should 
be required to offer a logical demonstration that the firm or firms employing the arrangement 
possess market power.”88  If market power is conventionally defined as the ability to increase 
profits by raising price, then private attempts to create property will always entail antitrust-type 
market power.  Restricting quantities must raise price, and it is the increased-profit potential of 
privatizing common-access resources that impels private parties to attempt to do so.  The essence 
of the government prosecution of the fishers in the GCSOA, for example, was that they raised 
price.89 
“Second, the plaintiff should be required to demonstrate that the defendant’s practices are 
capable of enriching the defendant by harming consumers.”90  Again, whether consumers are 
harmed depends on whether a longer-run property-rights perspective or a shorter-run antitrust 
perspective is adopted.  In the short run, since prices must rise as a result of defining property 
rights, as compared to a regime where no property right exists or is respected, consumers must be 
harmed.  No property rights in the fishery means free fish for anybody who can catch them.  But 
what of the longer-run issue, whether property-right protection is necessary for the good to exist 
in the first place or persist in the longer run?  Resolving that issue raises anew the intractable 
problem of relative empirical measurements. 
                                                 
88  Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note __, at 17. 
 
89  Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass’n v. United States, 236 F.2d at 662. 
 
90  Easterbrook, supra note __, at 18.   
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Other of Judge Easterbrook’s suggested filters, while clearly useful in contexts where no 
property rights issues arise, are likewise unhelpful – or even perverse – in a setting where 
property and antitrust issues clash.  A court should ask “whether the evidence is consistent with a 
reduction in output.”91  This test is indeed salutary in the setting for which the Sherman Act 
seemingly was designed, one in which property exists and enforced; it is a test embraced and 
used by others in standard antitrust litigation.92  But of course, the very essence of removing 
resources from open access into a regime of property (communal or private) is to reduce 
production from non-maximizing, over-exploiting levels.   
The foregoing is no criticism of Judge Easterbrook’s filters.  They have exerted an 
important influence in antitrust thinking since their appearance some twenty years ago, and 
deservedly so.  The point, rather, is that they are effective in the standard antitrust paradigm in 
which property rights are already well defined and enforced.93  When antitrust cases arise outside 
that paradigm, standard antitrust thinking risks to diminish social welfare by applying the tools 
of maintaining competition in situations where the standard assumptions do not apply.   
B. Enforcement Competition 
Antitrust is unusual in the number of potential enforcers of the law, both American and 
foreign.  The enforcers all stand to gain in various ways, politically for some and pecuniarily for 
others.  There is nothing necessarily objectionable about that; it is the possibility of benefit that 
                                                 
91  Easterbrook, supra note 18, at __.   
 
92  E.g., Blair and Romano, Distinguishing Participants from Nonparticipants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Liability 
and Damages, in Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs (F. McChesney, ed.) 1998. 
 
93  Judge Easterbrook’s recommendation that, for the most part, antitrust should only pursue “plain vanilla cartels 
and mergers to monopoly” is certainly unobjectionable in principle.  Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note __, at 
1701.  But it leaves open the question, what is a “plain vanilla” cartel?  Does it include agreements like that at issue 
in Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass’n v. United States, supra note __?  Or that in Unites States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., supra note __? 
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impels plaintiffs to bring actions in any area of law.  But developments have shown that having 
multiple enforcers of antitrust can produce undesirable results. 
1. Competition Among American Enforcers 
Enforcement of antitrust is unique by the standards of American law, and sometimes 
perverse by the standards of economics.  It is unique because, first, there are two national-
government agencies that enforce the law.94  Unique, second, because there is also state 
enforcement of the law, under statutes that mimic the applicable federal statutes and under 
holdings that explicitly adopt federal court law as the applicable precedent.95  And unique, third, 
because there is also private enforcement of federal antitrust law, with treble damages (plus costs 
and attorney’s fees) for successful private plaintiffs.96   
An important improvement in antitrust law during the past generation has been the 
reduction of private treble-damage actions in the overall scheme of antitrust enforcement, and so 
less competition between public and private enforcers.  Private cases brought by competitors 
complaining of actions that are actually pro-competitive no longer succeed.97  Also, courts are 
more alert to plaintiffs’ understandable desire to characterize as treble-damage antitrust cases 
disputes that really sound in more traditional areas like contract or business torts, and thus to 
                                                 
94  See text accompanying note __, infra. 
 
95  See Hovenkamp, supra note __, at 590. 
 
96  Section 4 of the Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. sec. 15, provides that “any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore…and shall recover 
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 
 
97 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo-Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, supra note __; Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 
104 (1986); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).   
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deny recovery on antitrust grounds.98  And, perhaps most important in terms of competition for 
antitrust enforcement, the Supreme Court limited private recovery for anticompetitive 
overcharges under federal antitrust law to plaintiffs who are direct purchasers from antitrust 
violators.99  No longer, then, would subsequent  – so-called “indirect” --  purchasers compete 
among themselves and with direct victims of illegal overcharges for a chance at the triple-
damage trough.   
But as private involvement in antitrust enforcement has diminished, public enforcement 
of antitrust has become more competitive.  In particular, state attorneys-general have 
increasingly insisted in mounting their own antitrust enforcement efforts.   Most states had 
antitrust legislation when the Sherman Act was passed in 1890.  Subsequently, the states 
legislated anew, adopting the language of the national antitrust statute.  Until a generation ago, 
however, state involvement in antitrust enforcement was negligible, as compared to that of the 
federal government.100  States had only bit parts role on the antitrust stage, in part because they 
                                                 
98  E.g., Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 
(1983).  Almost all private antitrust litigation has been brought by (a) competitors of the defendant, or (b) those in a 
vertical contractual relationship – e.g., dealer, franchisee, licensee – with the defendant.  Salop & White, Economic 
Analysis of  Private Antitrust Litigation,” 74 Georgetown L.J. __ (1986); Shughart, “Assessing Private Antitrust 
Enforcement,” Regulation, Fall, 1990.  Competitor suits make no economic sense; a plaintiff can only gain from the 
defendant-competition cartelizing or monopolizing.  Suits among vertical contracting parties ordinarily are mere 
contract disputes having no competitive significance at all, since horizontal competition at any given vertical level is 
unaffected.  It is the possibility of treble damages that leads plaintiffs to try to cast the contract dispute as an antitrust 
violation. 
 
99  Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 
100 After 1914, the federal government itself had some competition in antitrust enforcement, between the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.  That enforcement duopoly ended when  
the Antitrust Division and the FTC concluded a market-division agreement by which each industry was awarded to 
one enforcement agency or the other.  For discussion and data on the price and output effects of reducing 
competition in public enforcement, see Shughart & Tollison, The Positive Economics of Antitrust Policy: A Survey 
Article, 5 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 39 (1985).  
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could not bring actions parens patriae on behalf of their citizens.101  That changed in 1976, when 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, in addition to creating the regulatory regime 
that now applies to mergers, gave state attorneys-general the ability to bring actions parens 
patriae for damages under the federal antitrust laws.102 
State antitrust enforcers differ from the national government’s enforcers in three 
important ways.  First, given that most antitrust offenders will operate across state borders, any 
particular state is at a disadvantage in pursuing antitrust offenses by itself.  Second, given that the 
state attorney- general has responsibility for all of her state’s legal work, there will be relatively 
few lawyers and staff devoted to antitrust work, and they – like the attorney-general herself – 
will be relatively unspecialized.103  And finally, the state AG is an elected official, often one with 
aspirations for higher office.  The joke goes that “AG” refers to “aspiring governor.”  And so, the 
antitrust agenda of the state attorneys-general will be one driven more by political than truly 
economic concerns, as compared to that of the non-elected national enforcers.104 
From these three differences derive several predictions.  First, since a single state can do 
little by itself in ferreting out and pursuing multi-state antitrust offenses, and given that few if 
any offenses are not multi-state, a state AG will only become interested in antitrust to the extent 
                                                 
101  Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
 
102  15 U.S.C. §15c-15h. 
 
103  Posner, supra note __, makes a stronger claim, based on his experience as a Supreme Court law clerk and now as 
a judge, that lawyers in state attorney-generals’ offices are of below-mean quality, because the salaries they are paid 
are so low.  Posner, supra note __, at 941.   
 
104  This is not to say that the national antitrust agenda is not a product of politics.  See generally F. McChesney & 
W. Shughart II, eds., The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public Choice Perspective (1995). 
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that her fellow AG’s are similarly willing to get involved.105  But second, to the extent that more 
and more states are willing to get involved, the efforts of the state AG’s merely duplicate what 
could be done by a national antitrust enforcer.  If all fifty state attorneys-general want to pursue a 
Fortune 100 company operating in all 50 states, they will have to coordinate their efforts and 
devise ad hoc ways to pursue the case.  The national enforcement agencies are already set up to 
handle national cases.  State enforcement thus will entail great fixed costs in organizing to pursue 
cases, and great marginal costs in actually pursuing them, as compared to how the national 
agencies operate.  And finally, as politically motivated organizations, state attorneys-general will 
look for high-profile but easily-won cases, ones that will resonate with voters as the attorney-
general mounts the stump at the next election. 
If so, further predictions follow as to the kind of cases states will pursue.  Two sorts will 
dominate.  First, states will be seek cases in which the national enforcers are already involved, or 
likely to be.  That is, the states, as the more costly enforcers should they pursue their own cases, 
will be interested in “piling on” in cases where the national enforcers are already active.106  The 
Microsoft case exemplifies this first type of case, in which the states essentially free ride on the 
federal government.107  The states’ theory of the case was no different from that of the federal 
government, Judge Jackson ruled early in the litigation.  Years later, at the end of the case, state 
                                                 
105  See First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1004, 
1014  (2001), for details on how states organize their cooperation on antitrust matters, particularly through the 
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). 
 
106  See Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 Antit. L.J. 925, 940-41 (2001): “No sooner does the Antitrust 
Division bring a case, but the states … are likely to join the fray….The effect is to lengthen the original lawsuit, 
complicate settlement, magnify and protract the uncertainty engendered by the litigation, and increase litigation 
costs.  For arguments counter to those of Judge Posner, see Doris, Another View on State Antitrust Enforcement – A 
Reply to Judge Posner, 69 Antit. L.J. 345(2001); First, supra note __.  Both the Doris and First arguments are 
discussed below. 
 
107  First, supra note __, at 1028, justifies free riding because the states have “inadequate resources.” 
 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art32
 35
complaints about the allegedly lenient remedies the federal government had obtained against 
Microsoft were brushed aside by the federal district court.108 
For state attorneys-general, free-riding on the efforts of the national enforcers has its 
down side, in that most of the glory will inure to the feds.  Low costs are matched by low 
benefits.  States will naturally be interested, therefore, in cases that the federal government 
declines to pursue.  But what will those cases entail?  By definition, conduct that the federal 
enforcers do not find it worth pursuing.   Moreover, the cases must deliver a victory at relatively 
little cost, since the states will be bearing the financial burden themselves. 
Consider a case like that against Salton, Inc. for resale price maintenance of its George 
Forman™ grills, provisionally settled in September 2002.109  The case is one in which the federal 
antitrust authorities would have no interest.  Resale price maintenance is now understood to be 
an intra-brand practice that enhances inter-brand competition.  Economists almost unanimously 
applaud it as procompetitive, a way to enhance distributor efforts to market the product vis-à-vis 
competing brands that almost never has countervailing anticompetitive aspects.110  Resale price 
maintenance simply has no place in the modern, economics-based enforcement agenda. 
                                                 
108  Harmon, “Judge Backs Terms of U.S. Settlement in Microsoft Case,” N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 2002, p. A1 (district 
judge “largely dismissed the contention by nine states that broader restrictions on Microsoft were necessary”);  
Krim, “Judge Accepts Settlement in Microsoft Case,” Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 2002, pp. A1, A14 (federal district judge 
“all but ridiculed the states for the legal theories they put forth  to justify tougher restrictions”).  See also Johnson, 
“Microsoft Ruling a Blow to Sates Case,” Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 2002 ( 
109  The author’s wife has purchased two of the millions of grills sold.  He has no other involvement with the Salton 
case, and thanks Alan Silberman for providing useful information about it. 
 
110  Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J. L. & Econ. 12 (1960); Ippolito, Resale Price 
Maintenance: Evidence from Litigation, 34, J. L. & Econ. 263 (1991); see also Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, 
Imperfect Prices and the Economics of Retail Services, 79 Nw. L. Rev. 736  (1984). 
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However, resale price maintenance cases like that against Salton are a natural for the state 
attorneys-general.111  First, anomalously, resale price maintenance remains per se illegal under 
the Sherman Act , and thus under states’ little Sherman Acts. Therefore, victory is automatic – 
and cheap.  All that need be shown is a contract to set resale prices, or something that a jury 
might so construe.  Victory is even easier when the states sue for hundreds of millions of dollars 
($240 million in the Salton case) and then offer a settlement for cents on the dollar ($8 million 
dollars in the Salton case).  No company, particularly one with public shareholders, could refuse 
a settlement offer for so little.  To do so would invite a shareholder suit. 
Salton’s George Forman™ grill is one of the great success stories in kitchen appliance 
sales.  With unit sales in the millions, its high profile is guaranteed by George Forman’s name 
and ability to promote it.  Hanging the scalp of a brand-name retailer and a phenomenally 
successful product on an attorney-general’s wall was not likely to discourage the two lead AG’s 
in the Salton case, New York’s Eliot Spitzer and Illinois’ James Ryan.112  The former has shown 
himself not averse to publicity; the latter was running for governor at the time the suit’s 
settlement was announced.113   
The suit certainly was valuable to the attorneys-general.  What, however, was in it for 
consumers, the supposed beneficiaries of antitrust?  Nothing, apparently.  Not only is resale price 
                                                 
111  In defending the antitrust role of state attorneys-general, the Chief Deputy Attorney General in the Office of the 
Illinois Attorney General notes, “The states have investigated resale price maintenance activity, obtaining a $9.5 
million settlement against Reebok, and, separately, against Nine West ($34 million), among others.  Doris, supra 
note __, at 345.  See also In re Panasonic Consumer Electronics Products Antitrust Litig., 1989-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 
68613 (S.D. N.Y. 1989) (approving settlement). 
 
112  The Settlement Agreement defines Spitzer and Ryan as “Lead Counsel” in the suit.  Salton’s settlement checks 
were to be sent to them. 
 
113  For Ryan, the case had all the more publicity value because Salton is an Illinois corporation.  
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maintenance generally a beneficial practice socially,114 but the settlement amount was laughable 
in terms of redressing any supposed consumer injury.  The settlement amounted to just pennies 
per grill sold.  But the attorneys-general did not even try to get the money to the actual sufferers 
of any higher prices.  Instead – attorneys-general are politicians, and 2002 was an election year – 
the money was destined elsewhere: 
In view of the difficulty in identifying the millions of purchasers of the 
Salton grills covered by the settlement and relatively small alleged 
overcharge per grill purchased, the States propose to use the $8 million 
settlement in the following manner: Each State shall direct that its share of 
the $8 million be distributed to the State, its political subdivisions, 
municipalities, not-for-profit corporations and/or charitable organizations 
for health or nutrition-related causes.  In this manner the purchasers covered 
by the lawsuits (persons who bought Salton George Foreman™ Grills) will 
benefit from the settlement. 
 The candor in this statement is commendable.  Not only will supposedly-wronged 
consumers not get any money, but the supposed overcharge was “relatively small” to begin with.  
If the overcharge was “relatively small,” Salton cannot have much market power to begin with.  
Thus, the case flunks one of the principal filter-tests that Judge Easterbrook rightly would 
impose to evaluate the worth of a standard antitrust case.115 
                                                 
114  See text accompanying note __, supra.   
 
115  The state attorneys-general attempted to finesse the market power issue by doing what antitrust plaintiffs 
typically do.  They defined the relevant product market as “contact grills,” that is, grills that “are hinged, two-
surfaced electric cooking appliances, which cook food on both sides simultaneously when the two surfaces are 
closed, [and which] may also permit excess grease to be drained away from the food into a receptacle.” Complaint, 
¶2. That definition describes a product: the Salton George Foreman™ grill.  But it certainly does not describe a 
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 The foregoing describes some of the costs of having an independent state role in antitrust.  
But the real question is whether the costs are outweighed by any benefits from a separate state 
enforcement role.  In justifying a separate state role, defenders of state antitrust enforcement 
respond in various ways.  One can dismiss quickly one argument for state enforcement, that the 
value of having states enforce the antitrust law is shown by their successfully getting money 
settlements in antitrust cases.116  If getting money from business firms were itself proof of social 
value, street gangs seeking “settlements” from local merchants would be put on pedestals rather 
than in jail.  Getting more money out of the private citizenry to buy off politically motivated 
attacks is anything but proof that politicians are doing good (as opposed to doing well for 
themselves).117 
An antitrust role for the states is also said to be justified because the state statutes permit 
private plaintiffs who are indirect purchasers – and states suing on their behalf -- to obtain 
damages, whereas the federal statutes after Illinois Brick do not.118  To a considerable extent, the 
argument is just a variant of the one above: by bringing actions that would not be brought under 
federal law, states can get money from business firms.  Whether states’ ability to seek remedies 
                                                                                                                                                             
market: there are innumerable cooking substitutes for hinged, two-surfaced electric cooking appliances, which cook 
food on both sides simultaneously when the two surfaces are closed, and permit excess grease to be drained away 
from the food into a receptacle.  Naturally, however, with a single product defined as the entire market, Salton must 
have market power, and so the complaint alleged: “Salton dominates the market for contact grills.”  Complaint, ¶3. 
 
116  See, e.g., Doris, supra note __, who recites various amounts received in state antitrust cases as indicating that the 
cases demonstrate a useful role for state antitrust aneforcement.  First, supra note __, at 1005 & 1037, makes a 
similar argument: “the history of state enforcement and the current record of state enforcement results demonstrate 
that the states do play an important role in antitrust enforcement today.  That role features the pursuit of remedies 
that benefit consumers, particularly monetary remedies….If there is one consistent thread to state antitrust 
enforcement in the past sixty years, it is the effort to collect money damages for violations of the antitrust laws.”   
 
117  See generally F. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction and Political Extortion (1997). 
 
118  Following the Illinois Brick decision, states passed legislation to allow indirect purchasers to recover under state 
antitrust laws, legislation that was upheld in California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).  See First, supra 
note __, at 1008-1012. 
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not available to the federal government is a good thing depends on the kind of cases states 
pursue; recovering money tells one nothing about the validity of the suit.119 
It is claimed that a state role is justified because anticompetitive contracts or practices 
may “affect the local populace but may not be sufficiently broad ranging to attract federal 
attention.”120  A defensible theoretical argument, but one that hardly applies to states’ free-riding 
on pre-existing federal antitrust actions like Microsoft.121  Likewise, Salton’s nationally 
profitable grills can hardly be described as affecting mostly the “local populace.”  Particularly 
when all 50 states and the District of Columbia bring the action, as in the Salton case, the 
supposed problem is by definition national, not local. 
 In the end, suspicion abides that state antitrust enforcement is mostly about politics: a 
defender of state antitrust activity summarizes that “state attorneys general have made a 
significant contribution to their constituents,” a revealing choice of words.122  To compete 
politically, the states must come up with enforcement programs that go beyond that of the federal 
government.123   As a latecomer to the antitrust feast, the states can only get an extra seat at the 
                                                 
119   Some arguments offered for a separate state antitrust role focus on enforcement of judgments obtained by 
others.  States may be efficient distributors of the proceeds from successful antitrust cases brought by others.  It is 
said, for example, that in a case brought by the FTC and joined by the states against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, 
the states “have taken full responsibility for the distribution of the settlement funds to the purchasers of the drugs.” 
Doris, supra note __, at 346.  But administrative functions like a check-writing clearinghouse hardly require an 
antitrust legal squad; states already have a vast investment sunk in their tax, welfare and other redistributive 
bureaucracies.    
. 
120  Doris, supra note __, at 345. 
 
121  “Although the anticompetitive impact of Microsoft’s conduct on innovation is certain important from a public 
policy point of view, the effects on consumers are not localized in any way.” First, supra note __, at 1019. 
 
122  Doris, supra note __, at 346 (emphasis supplied).  
 
123  States have legislated their own horizontal merger guidelines, which are more aggressive than those of the 
federal government.  The states have also issued vertical restraints guidelines that are more stringent than those that, 
were set out in guidelines (now withdrawn) by the federal government. 
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table by being pushy.  That lesson has apparently not been lost on others who would take their 
place at the table.    
2. Competition With Foreign Enforcers 
In the longer run, perhaps the most important aspect of competition within the antitrust 
enforcement field will come from the rise of non-American antitrust regimes.  The Sherman Act 
was the first national competition legislation.   For generations, the United States monopolized 
the field of antitrust.  Although American firms abroad encountered little or no antitrust 
legislation there, foreign firms wishing to do business here had to submit to legal standards that 
did not apply in their own countries.  That monopoly on antitrust law gave the United States a 
reach beyond its borders in imposing antitrust standards on behavior occurring in and affecting 
foreign nations.   
However, monopolies – be they private or governmental -- endure only to the extent that 
there are barriers to entry.  With most important companies now operating internationally, the 
United States has had no way to prevent other national authorities from legislating and enforcing 
their own antitrust laws.  The fact that antitrust has traditionally allowed American political 
authorities to control economic resources could not have been lost on their foreign counterparts, 
also interested in controlling resources.   
And so, the past generation has increasingly seen the rise of antitrust in foreign nations, 
most notably as part of the European Union (EU).124  The operative legislation under which EU 
                                                 
124  The rise of antitrust in Europe is certainly the most important extra-American event in the past generation of 
antitrust.  See generally E. Fox, The Competition Law of the European Union (2002).  But European antitrust law in 
only one of dozens of international antitrust legal systems that now exist.  For discussions of various other non-
American antitrust systems, see ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Competition Laws Outside the United States (2001);  
Chao et al. (eds.), International and Comparative Competition Law and Policies (2001); Evenett et al. (eds.), 
Antitrust Goes Global (2000).    See also Fox, The Antitrust Laws of the United States and the Ley de Competencia 
of Mexico: A Comparative Review, 4 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 11 (1996). 
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competition law operates is not very different doctrinally from that of the United States.125   The 
law “can be divided into three areas: collusion, dominance and mergers,” a more compact and 
intellectually appealing taxonomy than that which currently afflicts American antitrust law.126  
Several aspects of EU competition law are noteworthy, indeed praiseworthy.  To revert to Justice 
O’Connor’s lament in the Jefferson Parish case, there is no separate statutory “box” in EU 
competition law for tying, for example, akin to section 3 of the Clayton Act.   
European antitrust activism is a relatively recent phenomenon, just a generation old.  The 
economics and politics by which ultimately it will work remain to be seen.  But several lessons 
from the American antitrust experience are instructive.   
First, it is not surprising that a large, trans-European antitrust regime has emerged in the 
EU.  Individual European countries are at a disadvantage in antitrust enforcement similar to that 
of the individual American states.  Most important enterprises operating in Europe do so 
transnationally, just as most large American firms operate across the several states, so any 
particular European country operates at a disadvantage in pursuing supposedly anticompetitive 
problems of any consequence.  It makes sense to pursue antitrust offenses collectively.  Hence 
the desirability, in principle, of European enforcement of otherwise-national antitrust law by 
cartelizing enforcement under an organization like the EU. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
125  See generally ABA Section of Antitrust Law, European Union, in Competiti8on Laws Outside the United States, 
supra note __; V. Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (6th ed. 1997).  “The primary 
sources of competition law within the EU are the EC [Eurpoean Communities] Treaties and the competition laws of 
the individual member countries.  Because the EU is a political rather than a legal body, there is no EU competition 
law as such; there is the competition law of the European Communities, which together are one part of the EU.  EU 
competition law is a common, albeit legally imprecise, way of talking about the competition law of the European 
Communities. “  Sjostrom, Competition Law in the European Union and the United States, in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. 1 371 (P. Newman, ed.), 1998 
 
126 Sjostrom,.  supra note __, at 370. 
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But the structure of European antitrust enforcement differs importantly from that 
characterizing the state-federal relationship in the United States.127  Most important, EU 
enforcement is not directed by an organization made up of representatives answering to national 
political authorities, the way that the NAAG is just a coalition of representatives from state AG 
offices.  Rather, the enforcement of EU competition law is entrusted to a professional 
bureaucracy, separate from that of national governments, with the same permanence found in 
other international bureaucracies like the United Nations or the OECD.128  The NAAG represents 
the responsible antitrust authorities (the attorneys-general) of individual states; the EU 
competition bureaucracy does not represent the antitrust authorities of the European member 
states. 
Moreoever, the law applied by the EU and individual European nations is often not the 
same.  “The EEC has a common competition policy, and, as well, each member state has its own 
antitrust law. Only with respect to big mergers does the common competition policy overrides 
national law.  Otherwise, member states may apply their own competition laws as long as it does 
not conflict with EEC competition law or enforcement.”129  In short, while the American 
attorneys-general function via a loose federation of state politicians, working with personnel that 
are under their control (and thus whose careers depend on the attorney-general’s political 
                                                 
127  Analyses of the politics of American antitrust have left many important questions unanswered.  See generally 
McChesney & Shughart, supra note __.  But despite recognition that antitrust is just government regulation, almost 
no work has been done on the politics of European antitrust.  .For a summary of the small literature on the politics of 
European antitrust, see Sjostrom, supra note __., who also notes of economists, “Of the interest group foundations of 
EU competition policy, their ignorance is encyclopaedic.”  Id. at 376. 
 
128  Concerning the latter, see Winslow, The OECD’s Global Forum on Competition and Other Activities, 18 
Antitrust 38 (2001).   
 
129  Fox, supra note __, at __.  For summaries of the national antitrust regimes of France Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, including their relation to EU law, see ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note __, vol. II. 
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fortune), EU antitrust enforcement includes a permanent bureaucracy largely unreachable by 
individual national authority, applying and enforcing its own dictates. 
And so, judging from the American experience, one would expect that individual 
European governments would take a back seat to the EU antitrust enforcement regime.  In the 
United States, the states must gear up ad hoc to tackle each case they decide to pursue, making 
them the higher cost enforcer as compared to the federal government, with its two permanent 
bureaucracies.  In Europe, however, it is the EU that has the permanent antitrust bureaucracy for 
pursuing trans-European antitrust enforcement.  Thus, while the American government pursues 
the major antitrust cases (with the states either free-riding on those cases or instituting relatively 
unimportant actions of no interest to the federal government), the reverse would be true in 
Europe.  The European Union permanent bureaucracy, not enforcers from a particular country, 
would undertake the principal enforcement actions in Europe. 
Given the institutional arrangements involving the EU and European national 
governments, how predictably would EU antitrust enforcers treat contracts and practices that 
affect both the United States and Europe?  The independent bureaucracy operating in Europe 
would respond to the incentives that it faces.  The Europeans are antitrust newcomers, and so 
will only justify their existence by imposing more restrictive rules than the American federal 
enforcers impose.  A mere “me too” attitude hardly justifies a separate European presence in 
global antitrust.  Modern stand-offs between the United States and Europe on mergers, such as 
the proposed GE-Honeywell merger, are exemplary in that respect.130 
                                                 
130  See, e.g., Reynolds & Ordover, Archimedean Leveraging and the GE/Honeywell Transaction, 70 Antit. L.J. 171, 
171 (2001) (the proposed merger was “”unprecedented” because of its approval by American antitrust enforcers but 
then rejected by European enforcers, “even though both GE and Honey well were headquartered in the United 
States”).   
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In GE/Honeywell, a foreign antitrust authority for the first time prohibited a 
merger that the United States had permitted.  It was also the first time the 
world’s major antitrust agencies confronted each other across a clear line of 
disagreement: the rules implicit in the European decision – vigorously 
defended by their authors – were declared by the U.S. ‘antithetical’ to the 
purposes of competition law.  The general public thereby became aware of 
conflicting approaches to business regulation in the world’s two largest 
economies.131 
 
The concern engendered by the EU’s GE/Honeywell  decision has beeen considerable.132  But 
GE/Honeywell  was not unprecedented; European objections to the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
merger, a largely vertical arrangement approved quickly in the United States, forced Boeing to 
abandon existing contracts that disfavored its European competitor, Airbus.133  The “acrimonious 
disagreement over the merger…took the United States and European Union to the brink of a 
trade war.”134 
 Other examples of the need to avoid a “me too” stance, which requires alleging offenses 
not pursued by Americans, are plentiful.  The EU’s case against Microsoft is a good example. 
                                                 
131  Lipsky, The ABA Section of Antitrust Law and International Antitrust Convergence: Sketching the Grand 
Design, 16 Antit. 46, 46 (2001).  Tad Lipsky is another prominent member of my antitrust generation.  We worked 
together in private practice, and took government positions at almost the same time.  In January, 1982, as Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, he obtained dismissal of the government’s ill-founded monopolization 
complaint against IBM, a case filed in 1969, still in its discovery phase, and of no value to anyone other than the 
district judge who had made a career of it. See in re Int’l Business Mach. Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(issuing writ of mandamus to federal court  to terminate litigation).  Returning to practice, he has remained active as 
an antitrust lawyer and scholar.  E.g., Lipsky, The Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce 
or Runaway Regulation?, 26 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59 (2002); Lipsky & Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 
Stan. L. Rev. 1187 (1999). 
 
132  See, e.g., the series of articles as part of a symposium, “Transatlantic Antitrust: Convergence or Divergence?” in 
Antitrust, vol. 16, no. 1 (2001). 
 
133  Cole & Wilke, “Boeing May Offer to End Exclusivity In Airline Accords to Help Acquisition,” Wall St. J., June 
25, 1997, p. A3.  See generally Boeder, The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger, in Evenett et al., supra note __.   
 
134 Armacost, Foreward, in Evenett et al., supra note __, at vii. 
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Although its American antitrust problems have now been resolved, with seemingly few 
important consequences,135 Microsoft faces continuing challenges from European antitrust 
enforcers.  Predictably, the European case has focused on areas like servers and media players 
that did not figure in the American case, and seeks sanctions different from those sought by 
American antitrust enforcers.136  Just as predictably, Microsoft’s competitors seek to take 
advantage of the separate European agenda to advance their own agendas.137  Having a European 
antitrust regime alongside that of the United States offers all the advantages of forum-shopping 
without the possibility that the cases might eventually be consolidated, and so be subject to a 
single standard.  
  Perhaps most egregious is the EU’s pursuit of vertical non-price restraints.  These 
agreements have practically no potential for impeding competition.  And so, while such 
agreements (involving things like manufacturers setting exclusive territories in their distributions 
chains) are almost always legal under American law,138 they have frequently been declared 
illegal in Europe.139  Indeed, the hostility with which European antitrust enforcers pursue 
companies thought to be using vertical non-price contracts is sometimes remarkable.140 
                                                 
135  See Krim, supra note __  (Microsoft’s settlement with the Justice Department “represents a remarkable legal 
turnaround for a company that two years ago faced the prospect of being broken up”). 
 
136 Krim, supra note __, at A14. 
 
137  “Microsoft Rivals Allege Antitrust in New EU Case,” Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 2003, p. A1 
 
138  Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  For a rare case in which a court, seemingly 
reluctantly, upheld a lower court decision imposing liability for non-price vertical restraints, see Graphic Products 
Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 
139  Consten and Grundig v. Commission, Cases 56, 58/64, [1966] ECR 299. 
 
140  European law allows unannounced raids against companies suspected of antitrust violations.  Raids against 
automobile companies suspected of vertical non-price arrangements have been undertaken recently.  See, e.g., 
Reinking & Jennen, “Antitrust Raids on Peugeot,” Fin. Times, Apr. 7, 2003, p. 18.  Some believe that Europeans’ 
views toward vertical contracts may be changing.  E.g., Wintersscheid & Ward, New Rules for Vertical Agreements 
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There is only one body of economics, by which antitrust supposedly is driven.  But with 
the United States still the dominant antitrust enforcer and Europe striving to create a niche for 
itself, one body of antitrust law seems unlikely to emerge.  In fact, there is demonstrated 
resistance in the EU against a single approach (“harmonization” is the term usually employed) to 
antitrust.141  Harmonization would mean that, once the American antitrust authorities had passed 
on a merger, or a case with international significance like Microsoft, there would be little for the 
Europeans to do. 
The incentives to maintain a separate EU antitrust presence vis-à-vis the United States are 
the same as those that, in America, drive state AG’s to maintain their own antitrust regimes.  Just 
as state attorneys-general find it useful for their own careers to bring high-profile antitrust cases, 
so is it widely suspected that EU antitrust actions are driven, at least in part, by what is perceived 
as politically and personally useful to the EU bureaucracy.  That bureaucracy is headed by Mario 
Monti, the European Commissioner for Competition Policy.  Known as “Super Mario” for his 
ability to bring actions against companies like General Electric and Microsoft, Monti is for 
“many American companies…the most powerful man in Europe.”142  Claims that EU actions are 
motivated by concerns about politics rather than economics are heard increasingly.143 
                                                                                                                                                             
Under European Union Competition Policy, Antitrust, Summer 2000, p. 52.  See also Meller, “Bayer’s Export 
Policy Upheld By a European Court Adviser,” N.Y. Times, May 23, 2003 (European Union’s advocate general 
calling “absurd” the European Commission’s finding that Bayer policy to limit sales to European countries with low 
prices constituted a collusive practice in violation of EU law). 
 
141  “Interview with Professor Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition Policy,” Antitrust, Spring 
2001, p. 6 
 
142  Raghavan and Michener, “Super Mario: EU’s Antitrust Czar Isn’t Afraid to Say No: Just Ask Time Warner,” 
Wall. St. J., Oct. 2, 2000, p. A1.    
 
143  Politics was frequently alleged as the basis for the EU’s disapproval of the GE/Honeywell merger.  E.g., Priest & 
Romani, “The GE/Honeywell Precedent,” Wall St. J., June 20, 2001, p. A18; Michener & Murray, “EU’s Monti 
Stands Firm on GE Deal: Commissioner Rejects Claims That Review was Politically Tainted,” Wall St. J., June 27, 
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Indeed, one would predict further, the European permanent bureaucracy would 
sometimes advance its own ends at the expense of national enforcers, in ways that staff from the 
state attorneys-generals’ office would never do as part of the NAAG.  The more independent a 
bureaucracy is, the more likely it will be “caught out” when political shifts in the underlying 
populace or national governments occur.144  That is exactly what has happened recently in the 
most recent wave of EU merger cases, in which several EU rulings objecting to mergers have 
been overturned by reviewing courts.145   
 
Conclusion 
 Established to protect competition, antitrust has itself been subject to much competition.  
The competition has occurred, first, for the field.  What is antitrust supposed to achieve?  The 
current antitrust generation has seen a pronounced shift in favor of the economic view of 
antitrust’s role, to the diminution of any political or social objectives once thought to be 
important antitrust goals.  Part and parcel of the economic approach to antitrust has been 
increasing judicial attention to Type I error in antitrust judgments, including the desirability of 
relatively simple antitrust rules. 
 Competition has occurred, second, in the antitrust field.  Here, many problems remain 
unresolved, ones involving both liability and enforcement.  As to the former, antitrust rules are 
                                                                                                                                                             
2001.  Likewise, the EU’s imposition of very onerous conditions for granting approval for the Boeing-McDonnell 
Douglas merger struck many as driven overtly by politics, not economics.  See Broeder, supra note __, at 142. 
 
144  E.g., Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the 
Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765 (1983). 
 
145  Case T-342/99, Airtours Plc v. EC Commission, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 7 (Ct. First Instance 2002); Case T-310/01, 
Schneider Electric SA v. EC Commission, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. 17 (Ct. First Instance 2002); Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval 
BV v. EC Commission (I), [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 28 (Ct. First Instance 2002); Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. EC 
Commission (II), [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 29 (Ct. First Instance 2002). 
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sometimes at variance with wider, non-antitrust rules concerning the creation and enforcement of 
property rights.  As to enforcement, although non-meritorious private actions have diminished 
during recent years, new problems of public enforcement have arisen.  The desire of both state 
attorney-generals in the United States and of foreign enforcers to assume larger roles on the 
global antitrust stage are particularly noteworthy.  How these issues are resolved in the next 
antitrust generation will be a subject of considerable interest. 
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